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Abstract: Healthcare applications are considered as promising fields for wireless sensor 
networks, where patients can be monitored using wireless medical sensor networks 
(WMSNs). Current WMSN healthcare research trends focus on patient reliable 
communication, patient mobility, and energy-efficient routing, as a few examples. However, 
deploying new technologies in healthcare applications without considering security makes 
patient privacy vulnerable. Moreover, the physiological data of an individual are highly 
sensitive. Therefore, security is a paramount requirement of healthcare applications, 
especially in the case of patient privacy, if the patient has an embarrassing disease. This 
paper discusses the security and privacy issues in healthcare application using WMSNs. 
We highlight some popular healthcare projects using wireless medical sensor networks, 
and discuss their security. Our aim is to instigate discussion on these critical issues since 
the success of healthcare application depends directly on patient security and privacy, for 
ethic as well as legal reasons. In addition, we discuss the issues with existing security 
mechanisms, and sketch out the important security requirements for such applications. In 
addition, the paper reviews existing schemes that have been recently proposed to provide 
security solutions in wireless healthcare scenarios. Finally, the paper ends up with a 
summary of open security research issues that need to be explored for future healthcare 
applications using WMSNs. 
Keywords:  healthcare applications; healthcare security issues; patient privacy issues; 
medical sensor networks; wireless sensor network; wireless body area network 
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1. Introduction  
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are an emerging technology in existing research and have the 
potential to transform the way of human life (i.e., make life more comfortable). A wireless sensor is 
the smallest unit of a network that has unique features, such as, it supports large scale deployment, 
mobility, reliability, etc. WSNs are not limited to science and engineering, but they are also included in 
other popular applications such as the military, water monitoring, infrastructure monitoring, 
government security policy, habitat monitoring, environment monitoring, and earthquake monitoring, 
are few examples. A sensor network consists of a discrete group of independent nodes with low cost, 
low power, less memory, and limited computational power that communicate wirelessly over limited 
frequencies at low bandwidth [1]. The main goals of WSNs are to deploy a number of sensor devices 
over an unattended area, and collect the environmental data and transmit it to the base station or 
remote location. Later, the raw data is processed online or offline for detailed analysis at the remote 
server according to the application requirements.  
1.1. Background 
In the 21st century, the healthcare industry has seen the drastic improvements due to the 
involvement of wireless medical sensor networks (WMSNs) in healthcare applications. A few decades 
ago WSNs were a topic of science/movie fiction for healthcare industries, and now they have become a 
reality and provide much quality-of-care. As the world’s aging population is increasing at an 
unprecedented rate in the developed and developing countries. According to the “An Aging World: 
2008” report [2], in 2008 the number of aging people worldwide (i.e., 65 years and older) was 
estimated at 506 million, and by 2040, that number will touch 1.3 billion. Thus, in just over three 
decades, the percentage of older age people will increase two times from 7% to 14% of the total world 
population [2]. Although the aging population signifies, a human success story of increased longevity, 
the steady, sustained growth of the older population also poses health challenges. As more and more 
people will be entering an elder age, the risk of developing certain chronic and debilitating diseases is 
significantly higher. For example, Alzheimer disease symptoms typically first appear after age 60 [3], 
Heart disease and stroke rates rise after age 65 [4], diabetes, like those of many other conditions (e.g., 
blood pressure, blood glucose levels etc.). Further, if aged populations prefer to live alone they do 
however require long-term monitoring for better independent life [5]. Thus the aging population 
desperately demands independent life and good quality-of-care without disturbing their comfort, while 
reducing their care costs. In this context, wireless sensor technology could provide highly useful tools 
for elderly people health monitoring and patients who need continuous monitoring. Consequently 
healthcare using wireless sensor networks constitutes an exciting and growing field for scientific 
investigation. In fact the future of modern healthcare in an aging world will need ubiquitous 
monitoring of health with least actual interaction of doctor and patients [6]. Recently, a term wireless 
medical sensor network (WMSN) has coined to bring many researchers together from interdisciplinary 
areas (bioengineering, electronics, computer, medicine), as shown in Figure 1.  Sensors 2012, 12  
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Figure 1. Interdisciplinary research of WMSN. 
 
 
Wireless medical sensors may be wearable, implantable or portable, and integrated on various kinds 
of wireless communication motes (such as, Mica2, MicaZ, Telos, etc.). A typical Mica2 mote has a  
7.3 MHz Atmel ATmega128L CPU with 128 KB of ROM, and 4 KB of RAM for data [7]. The radio 
operates at 76.8 Kbps bandwidth at a range of a few meters. Moreover, a sensor node typically has a 
limited battery power (e.g., AA-batteries), which is just enough for communication (e.g., unicast, 
multicast and broadcast) and computation [7]. Furthermore, WMSNs are different from generic WSNs. 
The main differences are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Difference between generic WSN and WMSN. 
Generic WSNs  WMSNs 
Automatic and standalone  Human involvement 
Scalability (i.e., large scale)  Scalability (i.e., small scale) 
Fixed or distributed deployment  Mobility 
Reliability (data rate depend on applications)  Reliability (high data rate) 
 
As we can see from the Table 1, generic WSNs are automatic and standalone, deployed at a large 
scale in either a fixed or distributed manner, and their data rates depend specifically on the applications, 
whereas WMSNs have direct human involvement (i.e., patient, doctor, nurse, etc.), are deployed at a 
small scale (i.e., depending on usability), must support mobility (a patient can carry the devices), and 
WMSNs requires high data rates (e.g., ECG data is normally sampled at a rate of 250 Hz and blood 
pressure at 100 Hz [8]), with reliable communication and multiple recipients [9]. Wireless medical 
sensor motes are deployed on a patient’s body, and are used to closely monitor the physiological 
condition of patients. These medical sensors sense the patient’s vital body signs and transmit the 
sensed data in a timely fashion to some remote location without human intervention. A doctor can use 
these medical sensor readings and gain a broader assessment of a patient’s health status. The patient’s 
vital signs may include heart beats, temperature, blood pressure, motion/acceleration, pulse-oximetry 
etc. Thus patients could benefit for continuous long-term monitoring after returning home from the 
hospital. Sensors 2012, 12  
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Figure 2. Healthcare application using wireless medical sensor networks. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 2, WMSNs carry the promise of quality-of-care across wide variety of 
healthcare applications (e.g., ambulatory monitoring, vital sign monitoring in-hospitals, elderly peoples’ 
at home care monitoring, monitoring in mass-casualty disasters, clinical monitoring, etc.). 
In addition, other applications that also benefit from WMSNs include sports-person health status 
monitoring [10], and patients’ self-care (i.e., a BAN network on a diabetic patient could be helpful to 
auto inject insulin though a pump, as soon as their insulin level declines).  
So far several research groups and projects have started to develop health monitoring using wireless 
sensor networks, for example, CodeBlue [7], LiveNet [11], MobiHealth [12], Alarm-Net [13],   
UbiMon [14], ReMoteCare [15], MobiCare [16,17], Lifeguard [18], AID-N [19], CareNet [20], 
ASNET [21], WiMoCa [22], SAPHIRE [23], THE-MUSS [24]. Thus, healthcare systems are the most 
beneficial applications using wireless medical sensor technology that can perform patient care within 
homes, hospitals, clinics, disaster sites and the open environment.  
1.2. Problem Statement 
The development of a wireless healthcare application offers many novel challenges, such as, 
reliable data transmission, node mobility support and fast event detection, timely delivery of data, 
power management, node computation and middleware [25-32]. Further however, deploying new 
technologies in healthcare applications without considering security often makes patient privacy 
vulnerable [8,33-36]. For instance, the patient’s physiological vital signals are very sensitive (i.e., if a 
patient has some embarrassing disease), so any leakage of individual disease data could makes him/her 
embarrassed. In fact sometimes revealing disease information can result in a person losing his/her job, Sensors 2012, 12  
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or make it impossible for him/her to obtain insurance protection [37]. Further, wireless medical sensor 
networks cover a broad range of healthcare applications, such as physiological data monitoring, and 
activity monitoring in health-clubs, location tracking for athlete, etc. Consequently, WMSNs share 
individual data with physicians (in a doctor-patient relationship), insurance companies (as insurance 
protection), and health-coaches (as sports team trainers) or with family (as relatives’ support) [38]. 
Therefore unauthorized collection and use of patient data by potential adversaries (such as insurance 
agents, for political reasons, rival coaches, personal enemies etc.) can cause life-threatening risks to the 
patient, or make the patient’s private matters publically available [37]. For example, in a simple 
scenario, a patient’s body sensors transmit his/her body data to a nurse/caregiver; it may happen that an 
attacker is also eavesdropping the patient data while the data is transmitting, and consequently the 
patient’s privacy is breached. Later that attacker can post the patient data on s social site (FaceBook or 
Twitter, etc.), and thus pose risks to the patient’s privacy, as depicted the Figure 3. Indeed wireless 
healthcare can offer many advantages to patient monitoring, but the physiological data of an individual 
are highly vulnerable, so security and privacy become some of the big concerns for healthcare 
applications, especially when it comes to adopting wireless technology. More importantly, a healthcare 
provider is subjected to strict civil and criminal penalties (i.e., either fine or imprisonment) if HIPAA 
rules [39] are not followed properly. Thus a patient security and privacy is the central concern in 
healthcare applications. 
Figure 3. Risks to patient privacy. 
 
 
Moreover, traditional security mechanisms needed unlimited resources, so they cannot be directly 
applied to the extremely resource-constrained sensor nodes. While WMSNs’ security requirements are 
the same as those of traditional networks, namely availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, 
data freshness and non-repudiations, thus resource conscious security protocols have emerged as one 
of the critical issue in healthcare applications using wireless medical sensor networks. There are other 
survey studies on security and privacy issues in wireless healthcare applications [8,33-36,40-43]. 
However, these studies discuss limited information about these security issues, so we can conclude that 
the topic of security in wireless medical sensor networks has not been properly investigated yet, which 
provides ample avenues to explore secure wireless healthcare applications. Sensors 2012, 12  
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1.3. This Paper’s Contribution 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: we present the state of the art in WMSN healthcare 
projects that have been introduced over the last decade and discuss their security flaws. We broadly 
explore the possible security threats that can endanger healthcare applications, including patient’s 
privacy issues. Further this paper presents an overview of stringent government rules and regulations 
for healthcare organizations and their business partners. We also instigate discussion on existing 
security mechanisms that need to be explored, and sketch out the imperative security requirements in 
wireless healthcare. This paper also includes a holistic overview on recent available literature that has 
proposed solutions for secure healthcare application using WSNs.  
The rest of the survey is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of recent WMSN 
healthcare projects. Sections 3 discuss the security and privacy issues for wireless healthcare 
applications and Section 4 discusses the stringent regulations for healthcare organizations. Section 5 
discusses the issues of existing security mechanisms, and Section 6 points out the inherent security 
requirements to develop a secure healthcare application. Section 7 presents the related works for secure 
healthcare applications using WMSNs. Section 8 provides discussions on several open issues that are 
required for the success of future healthcare applications and in Section 9 conclusions are drawn for 
wireless healthcare applications. 
2. Healthcare Projects Using Wireless Medical Sensor Networks 
The advancement of WMSNs in healthcare applications have made patient monitoring more 
feasible. Recently, several wireless healthcare researches and projects have been proposed, which aim 
to provide continuous patient monitoring, in-ambulatory, in-hospital, in-clinic, and open environment 
monitoring (e.g., athlete health monitoring). This section describes few of the popular research projects 
about healthcare systems using medical sensor networks.  
CodeBlue [7,44] is a popular healthcare research project based on a medical sensor network 
developed at the Harvard Sensor Network Lab. In this architecture, several medical sensors (e.g., pulse 
oximeter, EMG, EKG, and SpO2 sensor board onto the Mica2 motes [45]) are placed on the patient’s 
body. These medical sensors sense the patient body data and transmit it wirelessly to the end-user 
devices (PDAs, laptops, and personal computers) for further analysis. The basic idea of CodeBlue is 
straightforward, a doctor or medical professional issues a query for patient health data using their 
personal digital assistant (PDA), which is based on a publish and subscribe architecture. The medical 
sensors publish their relevant data to a specific channel and end-user subscribes the channel by using 
their hand-held devices (e.g., PDA and laptop). A TinyADMR routing component is used that is based 
on an adaptive demand-driven multicast routing (ADMR) protocol. TinyADMR facilitates node 
mobility, multicast routing and minimal path losses. Further, the CodeBlue architecture facilitates   
RF-based localization (i.e., called MoteTrack [46]), which is accurate enough to locate a patient’s or 
medical professional’s position. More importantly, CodeBlue’s authors acknowledge the need of 
security in medical applications, but until now security is still pending or they intentionally left the 
security aspects for future work, although, in [44] the authors suggested that elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) [47] is a good candidate for the key generation, and TinySec [48] is good for Sensors 2012, 12  
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symmetric encryption in CodeBlue project. Further, Kambourakis et al. [49] have sketched-out some 
security threat and attacks on the CodeBlue project such as denial-of-service attacks, snooping attacks, 
modification attacks, routing loop attack, grey-hole attack, Sybil attack and masquerading attacks. 
They address suitable countermeasures for CodeBlue security; for details reader may refer to [49]. 
CodeBlue is anticipated for deployment in pre-hospital and in-hospital emergency care, stroke patient 
rehabilitation and disaster response. We assumed that the authors have left security work for future.  
A heterogeneous network architecture named Alarm-Net was designed at the University of   
Virginia [13]. The research is specifically designed for patient health monitoring in the assisted-living 
and home environment. Alarm-net consists of body sensor networks and environmental sensor 
networks. Three network tiers are applied to the proposed assisted-living and home environment, as 
shown in Figure 4. In the first tier a resident wears body sensor devices such as ECG, accelerometer, 
SpO2 (i.e., a MicaZ boards [50]) which sense individual physiological data; and in the second tier 
environmental sensors such as temperature, dust, motion, light (i.e., MicaZ boards) are deployed in the 
living space to sense the environmental conditions. In the third tier an internet protocol (IP)-based 
network is used which is comprised of Stargate gateways called AlarmGate. The idea of Alarm-net is 
very simple, body sensors broadcast individual physiological data using single-hop to the nearest 
stationary sensor (i.e., second tier). Thereafter, the stationary emplaced sensor nodes forward the body 
data using multi-hop communication (i.e., shortest-path-first routing protocol) to the AlramGate. The 
AlarmGate is a gateway between the wireless sensor and IP networks, and is also connected to a  
back-end server. 
Figure 4. ALARM-NET architecture. 
 
 
Any real-time data queries about physiological or environmental data are originated by the user that 
contains the source address, ID, and sensor type. For a single-shot query, the sensors sample the 
requested data and respond a single report to the query originator, and hence complete the query. In 
addition, authors have developed a circadian activity rhythms program to aid context-aware power 
management and privacy policies.  Sensors 2012, 12  
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Further Alarm-Net facilitates network and data security for physiological, environmental, behavioral 
parameters about the residents. Only authenticated users can access the Alarm-Net and can query the 
sensor networks. The IP-network is secured by secure remote password (SRP) protocol for user 
authentication. The wireless sensor networks are enabled with Link-layer security suites. Sensors (i.e., 
MicaZ [50] and Telos [51]) use built-in cryptosystems, i.e., an advanced encryption system (AES) for 
cryptographic operations. AES security modes supported are: none, CBC-MAC authentication-only, 
CTR mode encryption-only, and CMM combines with authentication and encryption [13]. The major 
drawback of the built-in cryptosystem is that it does not offer AES-based decryption, by which means 
the encrypted data cannot be accessed by an intermediary node during communication, if needed. 
Further, hardware based built-in cryptosystem makes the application highly platform dependent. More 
notably, Pai et al. have pointed out some confidentiality infringement scenarios on Alarm-NET, such 
as the fact it is susceptible to adversarial confidentiality attacks, which can leak resident’s location; 
refer to [52] for details.  
UbiMon (Ubiquitous monitoring environment for wearable and implantable sensors) [14] is a BSN 
(Body Sensor Network) architecture composed of wearable and implantable sensors using an ad hoc 
network. The aim of the project is to provide continuous monitoring of an individual’s physiological 
states and capture transient as well as life threatening abnormalities that can be detected and predicted.  
Figure 5. UbiMon system architecture.  
 
 
As shown in the Figure 5, the UbiMon architecture consists of the following: (i) BSN node: Each 
node is integrated with bio-sensors (ECG, SpO2, temperature). (ii) LPU (Local Processing Unit): 
LPUs can be portable devices (PDAs, laptop, etc.) used to the gather data from BSNs, and are known 
as the base station. They detect the patient’s abnormalities and provide immediate warning to the 
physician. Apart from this function, the LPU works as a router between BSN nodes and the central 
server using wireless communication (for short range Bluetooth/Wi-Fi and long-range mobile Sensors 2012, 12  
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networks such as 3G/GPRS). (iii) CS (Central Sever): A CS feeds the patient data to the PD (Patient 
Database), and can analyze the patient’s data on the basis of patient’s condition, and detect potential 
life-threatening abnormalities. (iv) WS (Work-station): The WS is the patient’s data monitoring 
terminal (PC/laptop), which is used by the physician. Although Ng et al. proposed and demonstrated 
the ubiquitous healthcare monitoring architecture, it is widely accepted that without considering 
security for such applications they are often vulnerable to security attacks. So the authors did not 
consider security for wireless healthcare monitoring, which is a paramount requirement of healthcare 
applications, according to government laws [39]. 
In 2006, Chakravorty designed a mobile healthcare project called MobiCare [16]. MobiCare 
provides a wide-area mobile patient monitoring system that facilitates continuous and timely 
monitoring of patients physiological status. It (MobiCare) potentially improves the quality-of-patient 
care and saving many lives. As shown in the Figure 6, the proposed system comprises of body sensor 
network (BSN) having wearable sensors (e.g., ECG, SpO2, and blood oxygen); a BSN manager called 
“MobiCare client that is an IBM wristwatch”; and a back-end infrastructure (i.e., MobiCare server). 
The medical sensors timely sense the patient’s body data and broadcast it to the MobiCare client. The 
MobiCare client aggregates the body data and sends them using GPRS/UMTS or CDMA cellular link 
to the MobiCare server. In this research, MobiCare client makes use of application layer standard 
HTTP POST protocol for sending BSN data to the server. The MobiCare server supports to the 
medical staffs for offline physiological analysis, and for patient care [16]. 
Although, Chakravorty acknowledged the security issues in MobiCare, but only addressing security 
issues are not sufficient for real-time healthcare applications. In fact author suggested that the wireless 
application protocol (WAP), which is based on wireless transport layer security (WTLS) protocol 
could be used to provide the patient privacy, data integrity and authentication. Thus, security and 
privacy is still not implemented in MobiCare healthcare monitoring, or may have been left out for 
future work.  
Figure 6. MobiCare patient monitoring architecture. 
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In [53] authors proposed a personal ambient monitoring (PAM) project for mental health 
monitoring. The project aims to monitor the activity signatures of patients with bipolar disorder (BP). 
The PAM has two levels, namely, a personal ambient monitoring infrastructure (PAM-I) and a 
personal ambient monitoring programming architecture (PAM-A). PAM-I is composed of body and 
environmental sensors, mobile phones, and personal computers. The medical sensors are planted on an 
individual’s body and environmental sensors are placed in the home environment. The Bluetooth 
protocol used to connect the body sensors and mobile phones; further Bluetooth also connects the 
mobile phones and personal computers. Mobile phones are responsible for data aggregation from body 
sensors and send it to the PC for storage and analysis. It (the mobile phone) controls sensor collection, 
i.e., mental illness, using rule-oriented applications. The environmental sensors transmits data to the 
PC using multiple communication protocols (i.e., IEEE 802.11 b/g, X10, Bluetooth, etc.) [53]. On the 
other hand PAM-A is composed of custom applications that handle inter-device network 
communication (i.e., control and record the data, and transfer data offsite for analysis). PAM-A 
supports the mobile phone and the PC, further PAM-A applications are written in Java and Prolog (i.e., 
rule-based programming). This is the first attempt to obtain activity signatures from the mentally ill 
patient using worn and environmental sensors networks. Although, authors blaze a new research trail 
for mental illness monitoring, they focused mainly on reliability and acceptability issues. Although the 
authors are mainly concerned about wireless mental health monitoring applications where patient 
privacy is an imperative requirement for such applications, they did not address patient privacy, which 
is unacceptable for such healthcare applications.  
Recently, a new system designed at Johns Hopkins University named MEDiSN, especially designed 
for patients’ monitoring in hospital and during disaster events was reported [54]. It comprises multiple 
physiological monitors (called PMs), which are battery powered motes (i.e., Telos boards [51]) and 
equipped with medical sensors for collecting patients’ physiological health information’s (e.g., blood 
oxygenation, pulse rate, electrocardiogram signals, etc.), as shown in Figure 7.  
Figure 7. Healthcare architecture of MEDiSN. 
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The PMs are mobile, temporarily storing sensed data and transmitting it (after encrypting and 
signing the sensed data) to the relay points (RPs). MEDiSN incorporates different stationary RPs that 
are self-organized into a bidirectional routing tree, and forwards PM data to the gateways and   
vice versa. The RPs uses a collection tree routing protocol (CTP) to forward their measurements to the 
gateway. Moreover, MEDiSN is connected with a back-end database that constantly stores medical 
data and presents them to authenticated GUI clients. Specifically, this research focused on reliable 
communication, data rate, routing, and QoS [54].  
In their description of MEDiSN its authors acknowledged the need for encryption for PMs, but they 
did not describe which cryptosystem has been used for data confidentiality and how they have checked 
the authenticity of the delivered data. Thus, although the authors provided security to MEDiSN, their 
study did not reveal much information about their security implementation. Further, only authenticated 
clients can access and control the sensor network at back-end server, but which authenticated protocol 
they have used is unknown. As a result, from a security perspective authors failed to provide detailed 
information about their security mechanisms.  
In [55], the authors designed and developed a wearable personal monitoring service, called SATIRE, 
with the collaboration of the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia. SATIRE allows 
users to maintain a private searchable record of their daily routine activities (e.g., measured by two 
motion and location sensors). A person wearing a SATIRE jacket that can record his/her normal daily 
activities. When the person (i.e., wearing a jacket) comes into the vicinity of an access mote (i.e., 
connected to a personal computer), the logged data is uploaded reliably to a private repository 
associated with that person. Later, this data may be used to reconstruct the activities and locations of 
the person. Although, authors properly address security and privacy issues in SATIRE, they did not 
implement any security and privacy for sensitive physiological data. We must assume that the authors 
intentionally considered security a topic for future work.  
As we have seen, all the above on-going healthcare monitoring projects enable automatic patient 
monitoring and provide potentiated quality of healthcare without disturbing patient comfort. All the 
projects focus on the reliability, cost effectiveness and power consumptions of their prototypes, but 
although most of the healthcare projects mentioned above addresses the need for security and privacy 
for sensitive data (e.g., CodeBlue [7,44], MobiCare [16], STAIRE [55]), only a few embed any 
security (e.g., ALARM-NET [13], MEDiSN [54]), which is not sufficient for such critical applications. 
Hence, security and privacy have not been investigated in much depth, and challenges still remain for 
real-time wireless healthcare applications. 
3. Security and Privacy Issues 
This section discusses: (i) which would be the possible threats to a wireless healthcare application 
without implementation of proper security; and (ii) privacy issues. Before discussing the security 
issues in wireless healthcare applications, it is worthwhile to assume the scale of deployment of 
healthcare applications using WMSNs. In this regards, we have considered three wireless healthcare 
scenarios, namely, a nursing home, in-home monitoring, and in-hospital monitoring, as shown in 
Figure 8.  Sensors 2012, 12  
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Figure 8. Application scenarios for a nursing home, home care, and in-hospital. 
 
 
The wireless healthcare applications use medical sensors (i.e., as per patient appropriateness) and 
environmental sensors (ES), mobile devices (i.e., PDA, laptop or iPhone), and more especially wireless 
communication (i.e., IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4, Bluetooth etc.) protocols. Further, a back-end 
server is used for physiological healthcare information (PHI) storage, and for offline analysis of PHIs. 
According to the nursing home scenario Figure 8 (left), medical sensors are placed on a patient’s body 
and sense the physiological data of an individual and transmit it in a timely way to the PDA that may 
be held by a nurse. A nurse can query the patient’s sensors and analyze the real-time patient data 
conditions. Later she can send patient data to the central server either using Internet or a wireless 
medium. Many ES are deployed in nursing homes that can form a wired or wireless network, sense the 
environmental parameters (e.g., ward temperature, humidity, etc.) and transmit the data to either a 
nurse or a remote center. In addition, the environmental sensors may forward an alarm to the remote 
server in an emergency situation (e.g., supposing a severe condition is detected), should one occur. In 
the home scenario (Figure 8, upper right), medical sensors are planted on a patient’s body and capture 
the health data from an individual and transmit it in a timely fashion to a PDA held by a nurse or 
family member. In addition, environmental sensors are required when a patient is usually alone at home. 
The environmental sensors are placed at the corners of rooms, collecting the environmental conditions 
(e.g., room temperature, humidity, etc.), and patient movement data. Later they automatically send 
collected environmental and patient abnormal conditions to the PDA, which is held by either a nurse or 
a responsible family member. The home local station can directly communicate with environmental 
sensors using Zigbee modules. To analyze the patient physiological data an application program will 
be implemented at the back-end network. In the In-hospital scenario (Figure 8, bottom right), the same 
deployment and sensing scenario (i.e., as in the nursing home and homecare scenarios) is now 
applicable to the hospital environment, where groups of patients are temporarily monitored using a 
wireless medical sensor network by nurses or physicians using their PDAs; for more details the reader 
may refer to [56]. Sensors 2012, 12  
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3.1. Security Threats 
As we have seen in the above healthcare scenarios, WMSNs certainly improve patient’s   
quality-of-care without disturbing their comfort. The medical sensor senses patient sensitive body data 
and transmits it over the wireless channels which are more susceptible than wired networks. Thus, 
patient sensitive physiological variables must remain secure and private from security threats, so this 
sub-section discusses the possible security threats that would be harmful for the wireless healthcare 
success, as follows: 
Monitoring and Eavesdropping on Patient Vital Signs  
This is the most common threat to the patient privacy. By patient vital sign snooping, an adversary 
can easily discover the patient information from communication channels. Moreover, if the adversary 
has a powerful receiver antenna, then he/she can easily pick up the messages from the network. The 
captured message may contain the physical location of the patient, allowing an attacker to locate the 
patient’s position and physically harm him/her. In addition, an adversary can also detect the message 
contents including message-ID, timestamps, source address, destination address and other relevant 
information. Thus, monitoring and eavesdropping can pose a serious threat to patient privacy [8,16]. 
Threats to Information When in Transit  
As we know, wireless communication ranges are not confined, and are easily vulnerable. In 
wireless healthcare applications, medical sensors sense the patient and environmental data, and send it 
either to the physician or the hospital server. While sending the sensor’s data (i.e., in transit), it may be 
attacked. For example, an adversary can capture the physiological data from the wireless channels, and 
can alter the physiological data. Later, he/she may pass the attacked data (i.e., altered data) to the 
physician or remote server, which could endanger the patient. There are various types of in transit 
attacks: (i) Interception: Suppose, a WMSN has been compromised by a smart adversary. Then he/she 
can illegally access the sensor node data (e.g., cryptographic keys, sensor ID’s, type etc.). (ii) Message 
modification: In the message modification attack, the attacker can capture the patient wireless channels 
and extract the patient medical data; and later he/she may tamper with the patient data, which can 
mislead the involved users (e.g., doctor, nurse, family member, etc.). For example, suppose a 
cardiograph sensor transmits normal data to the medical staff, if an attacker able to modify the patient 
data during the communication and send the modified data to medical staff, it may cause an overdose 
of medicine being administered to the patient. Further, this modified data can trigger a false alarm or 
can hide the true patient conditions, if abnormal. Message modification threatens the message integrity 
of medical sensor nodes. 
Routing Threats in WSNs  
For the experimental scenario, consider the CodeBlue [7] and MEDiSN [54] and [57] architectures, 
which need a multi-hop environment (i.e., one node to another node) from body sensors to a remote 
server. A malevolent user could thus attack the network layer. He/she may steal or modify the packets, 
and forward the altered packets to the remote center (i.e., back-end) that may cause a false alarm. More Sensors 2012, 12  
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specifically in the CodeBlue [7] application, body sensors send their data using an ADMR routing 
protocol to the remote location (i.e., hospital). An attacker might alter the address fields of captured 
packets before forwarding them to the next hop, and consequently, misguide the route or even generate 
an endless routing loop [49]. The routing attacks in a multi-hop environment are the following:  
(i) Selective  forwarding:  In  multi-hop  environment [7,54,56,57], sensor packets (i.e., health data 
or environmental data) are expected to be forwarded to the base station or remote server via 
multi-hop routing. In this threat, malicious nodes may refuse to forward certain messages (e.g., 
ECG, temperature, etc.) and may simply drop them, so that they cannot be broadcast further. 
This threat can be stronger if the attacker is explicitly included in the routing path. Figure 9 
illustrates an example; suppose an ECG sensor forwards packets, i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4… 10, to the 
next hop. But if a patient’s enemy intentionally capture and drops some ECG packets, and 
only forwards a few packets, i.e., 4, 5, 6, 8 and 10, to the remote site [58], this could be life-
threatening in a patient emergency condition. Further, in [49], the authors point-out that the 
CodeBlue architecture is susceptible to grey-hole attacks. They claimed that if attackers 
modify the ADMR packet header of certain packets by small hop-count, they can make the 
adjacent nodes believe that the attacker is located in the shortest-path to the sink. Thereafter, 
the attacker can generously drop every packet, whatever he/she receives. That could cause life-
threatening risks.  
Figure 9. Selective Forwarding Attack.  
 
 
(ii) Sinkhole threat: In this threat, an attacker tries to attract all neighboring nodes to establish 
routes through a malicious node. Figure 10 illustrates a sinkhole attack; once the attacker is 
successful in the sinkhole attack, then the network is also open to other attacks [58], for 
example, eavesdropping or selective forwarding. Sinkhole attacks are very hard to detect [59].  
(iii) Sybil Attack: In this attack, a compromised node presents multiple fake identities to other 
neighboring nodes in the network [60]. Figure 11 illustrates how the multiple fake identities of 
a compromised node are sent to other neighboring nodes [58]. Further, Kambourakis et al. 
claim that the CodeBlue system is susceptible to Sybil attack, especially, when it operates in 
an ad-hoc manner; for details the reader can refer to [49]. The Sybil attack poses a significant 
threat in geographic and multipath routing protocols, because the compromised node may Sensors 2012, 12  
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appear in more than one place [61]. Further, in [60,62] the authors have discussed more 
routing attacks in the context of healthcare applications using sensor networks, e.g., sleep 
attack, fairness attack, and wormhole attack.  
Figure 10. Sinkhole Attack. 
 
Figure 11. Sybil Attack. 
 
Masquerade and Replay Threats  
In a home care application, an attacker can easily rogue a wireless rely point while patient data is 
transmitting to the remote location. In general wireless rely nodes are unguarded, so it may happen that 
a rogue rely node can provide unrestricted access to an attacker who can then cause a masquerade.  
In this threat, an illegal rely node acts as a real node to the network. This can lead to false alarms  
to remote sites and an emergency team could start a rescue operation for a non-existent person.   
A masquerade node can apply easily denial-of-service attacks, and can disrupt the application 
operation. It can even defeat the purpose of wireless healthcare. Thus, masquerading nodes can be very 
dangerous for healthcare applications. More important, if a masquerade relay node captures the patient 
physiological data, later, these captured messages can pose replay threats to the real-time healthcare 
application. Obviously the patient treatment depends on fresh received messages from medical sensor Sensors 2012, 12  
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networks. If masquerade nodes replay the old messages again and again, this could cause of 
mistreatment and overtreatment (i.e., medicine overdose) of the patients. Thus, masquerade and replay 
threats endanger real-time healthcare applications using wireless medical sensors. 
Location Threats  
Medical sensor networks support patient mobility, so exact patient location knowledge is needed 
since location knowledge allows reaching medical staff in a short time, in case of any emergency [63]. 
Generally, location-tracking systems are based on radio frequency [46], ultrasound, received signal 
strength indicator or some other technology [44]. Curtis et al. [64] have used geo-positioning to locate 
the patient and caregiver in their project called SMART (Scalable Medical Alert Response Technology). 
As the authors support localization system for the patients and medical staff, if an adversary constantly 
receives the persons’ radio signals and analyze them, then he/she gains details of those persons’ 
locations, which could directly infringe a person’s privacy.  
Activity Tracking Threats 
An adversary can obtain someone’s health status while he/she is busy exercising in a health-club. 
Based on a sensor’s captured data a malevolent user can guess the current activity of a patient and he 
may send the wrong exercise tips to the patient that could cause them severe pain. Considering another 
example, an athlete is being monitored using a wireless sensor network while he/she is practicing  
in the club [65]. Medical sensors are placed on the athlete’s body, which sense health data, e.g.,  
heart-rate, time and location, and send health feed back to the base station [10], so it might be possible 
for an adversary to modify the athlete’s health data, which may bring the athlete under suspicion in 
doping tests that could even spoil the athlete’s career.  
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Threats  
In [66] Wood-Stankovic stated that “a denial-of-service attack is any event that diminishes or 
eliminates a network’s capacity to perform its expected function.” Denial-of-service threat could be 
even more disruptive in healthcare applications because such a network needs always-on patient health 
monitoring (i.e., in-home, in-hospital, ambulatory etc.). As DoS threats are harmful to every 
application, we have directly adopted DoS from [66]. A list of denial-of-service attacks is shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Denial-of-service attacks at each network layers. 
Layers Attacks 
Physical layer  Jamming, Node tampering 
Link layer/medium access control   Collision, exhaustion, and unfairness  
Network and routing layer 
Neglect and greed, homing, misdirection, spoofing, 
replaying, routing-control traffic or clustering messages 
Transport layer  Flooding and De-synchronization 
Application layer  Overwhelming sensors, reprogramming attack 
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(i)  Physical layer: Jamming and tampering are the most common attacks on the physical layer.  
In jamming, generally, an attacker can squeeze the communication using high radio frequency 
(RF) signals, which disturb the network functionality. For example, medical sensor networks 
are small networks that squeeze early. Tampering is also known as a type of physical attack.  
A malevolent user steals the medical sensor and electronically interrogates it to extract the 
patient information from the sensor mote.  
(ii)  Link/medium access control layer: This layer suffers mainly from collision, exhaustion, and 
unfairness attacks. In collision attacks, an adversary simultaneously transmits the packets at 
same frequency, resulting in packet collision and degradation of the network performance.  
In exhaustion attacks the battery source is self-sacrificing, since wireless nodes most of the 
time maintains the channel active. In unfairness attacks, network performance degrades 
because medium access control layer priority is generally disrupted according to the application 
requirements.  
(iii) The network and routing layer: Routing-disturbance attacks lead to DoS threats in multi-hop 
medical sensor environments. Generally, the routing attacks involve spoofing; altering routing 
paths or replaying packets; selective forwarding; sinkhole; warm-hole, etc.  
(iv) Transport layer: It controls end-to-end links, and suffers mainly from two popular types of 
attacks, namely, flooding attacks and de-synchronization attacks. Flooding attacks generally 
are used to drain the memory resources by sending the control signals. In de-synchronized 
attack, attacker may disturbs the established link between two legitimate two ends nodes (i.e., 
body sensor and base station) by re-synchronizing their transmission. As a result, it disturb 
network communication, and network resources exhaustion [66,67].  
DoS attacks may damage the wireless healthcare application network, and can lead to the loss of the 
patient’s life. Thus these (DoS) attacks are always harmful to the mission-critical applications, such as 
location tracking, ambulatory, home care monitoring, etc. For more detailed studies of denial-of-service 
attacks, readers may refer to [60,66,67].  
3.2. Privacy Issues 
As wireless healthcare applications are not limited to monitoring the patient’s physiological data, 
but they also include emergency management, healthcare data access, electronic health records, etc. 
Further, individuals share their data with physicians (in a doctor-patient relationship), insurance 
companies (for insurance protraction), and health-coaches (as sports team trainers) or with family (as 
relatives’ support for recovery). So there is value in addressing the privacy issues that are ethical from 
a social point of view. We adopt the privacy definition from National Committee for Vital and Health 
Statistics (NCVHS), which is consultative board of the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services. “Health information privacy is an individual’s right to control the acquisition, uses, 
or disclosures of his or her identifiable health data [68]”. To maintain privacy, patients should have the 
rights to determine which data should be collected, used or disclosed. Any unauthorized collection or 
leakage of patient data could harm the patient. For example, an unauthorized person may use the 
patient data (such as, patient identity) for their personal benefit, such as for medical fraud, fraudulent 
insurance claims, and sometimes this may even pose life-threatening risks [69]. As the medical data is Sensors 2012, 12  
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very sensitive by the European Union Data Protection Directive [70], thus, there questions arise: who 
owns medical information, and how to control the access to medical data?  Further, in wireless 
healthcare applications, huge amount of health and life-style data are gathered that need close attention 
to who controls it, what is gathered, who has rights to access it and where/how/whether that data is 
stored or not [71].  
Meingast et al. [37] have raised similar questions regarding patient privacy: (i) Who can have 
permission to own the data; (ii) what type of medical data, how much, and where should the data be 
collected; (iii) who can have permission to inspect the medical data; and (iv) to whom should medical 
data be revealed to without the patient’s consent. In [38] the authors have discussed the privacy threats 
that raise questions about healthcare success: Identity threat: if a patient loses or share their identity 
that can pose significant financial, physical and emotional harm to an individual. An insider may use 
patient identity for their personal benefit, e.g., he/she misuse the identity to obtain reimbursement 
(insurance claims) or misuse the identity to obtain medical services [72,73]. Access threats: generally a 
patient is self involved in the access threats, if he/she fails to convey their consent properly. For 
example, in the absence of patient consent, an insider may damage the patient’s data and harm the 
patient for their personal reasons. In a patient medical record system, insiders may modify the medical 
records intentionally. For example, suppose an insider wrongly alters the patient’s medical data, such 
as, illness conditions, severe allergies, and specifically blood type, all of which pose life-threatening 
risks. For more details readers may refer to [38]. 
Ramli et al. have reviewed the privacy issues in a pervasive healthcare monitoring system [74].  
The authors identified a few privacy issues in pervasive healthcare, such as, misuse of medical 
information, leakage of prescriptions, eavesdropping on medical data, and social implications for the 
patient. Misuse of medical information: The patient health data flows on a wireless channel, therefore, 
it is open to all the wireless threats, such as eavesdropping and snooping. Thus patient privacy could  
be breached if an unauthorized person captures the wireless data and misuses it [74]. Leakage of 
prescriptions: the authors pointed out that medical prescription can be a big source of privacy violations. 
For instance, to transfer or sell the prescription data from pharmacy/doctor to third parties, since the 
medical prescriptions contain detailed information about a patient, i.e., name, id, diseases, etc. [74,75]. 
Thus leakage of prescription data becomes a privacy issue. Eavesdropping on patient medical 
information: patient medical information drifts on the wireless links, which are easily monitored. The 
monitoring system records patient data from communication channels and extracts the valuable patient 
information. Thus eavesdropping is very simple for an attacker, while the patient data is transmitting 
from the body area network to the caregiver device. Hence, the patient privacy breached. Social 
implications for the patient: Another privacy issue concerns the social implications, where a patient is 
not able to make decisions for their own privacy. For instance an older person (i.e., age 65 and above), 
especially if he/she suffers from dementia (i.e., dementia is a loss of mental skills that affects daily  
life [76]). Other authors have discussed difficulties in managing privacy settings and lack of support in 
designing privacy-sensitive applications; for more details readers may refer to [74]. 
This section has shown that security and privacy issues directly influence patient life and the 
healthcare system, if there is any loophole in the application security, so it is recommended to the 
forthcoming research that robust security should be considered from the beginning of the application 
design. Furthermore, as we have seen above the security and privacy issues could breach patient Sensors 2012, 12  
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physiological information, so there is a need for stringent regulation and laws that can act to mandate 
rigorous standards for protecting patient sensitive information. The next section discusses such 
stringent laws for healthcare providers and related organizations.  
4. Regulations and Laws  
Medical security and privacy is an imperative requirement in healthcare organizations all over the 
world, so there are many different regulations and acts that affect healthcare providers. In fact the 
regulations and acts vary greatly from country to country. Here we discuss the American Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) [39] and the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) [77]. 
  HIPAA regulates many different rules to be followed by doctors, hospitals, healthcare 
organization and other health related professionals. The Act requires comprehensive data 
security measures for data administration policies, data safeguards and supporting systems. 
According to the Act, healthcare providers are clearly subjected to strict civil and criminal 
penalties (i.e., either fine of $250,000 or imprisonment for 10 years) for those who acquire or 
disclose the patient health information for money-making or malevolent harm. Furthermore 
medical providers must guarantee that their system, and those of their business associates, 
ensures [78] the following: 
o  Security and confidentiality, i.e., patient health information is secure, and is in a proper 
format. 
o  Providing protection against any infringements of security, confidentiality and integrity, if 
they occur. 
o  Providing protection against unauthorized access to or usage of the patient health 
information. 
Further HIPAA regulates some other areas: 
o  Secure patient health records, particularly from those who do not need them. 
o  Establish systems that need user identities (i.e., both internal staff and consumers). 
o  Limit the access to sensitive data and applications to authorized personnel (i.e., role-based 
access control). 
o  Ensure integrity of patient health information throughout its life-cycle within the system. 
  The HITECH Act includes provisions to enlarge the use of information technology (IT) to store, 
capture, transmit, properly share and use health data. It introduces the new Act that states that 
those who manage patient health information (PHI) should notify the affected individuals if 
there is any breach that discloses their PHI [77].  
Although the involvement of wireless technology and Internet access are providing a low-cost 
communication infrastructure that is suitable for home care monitoring, ambulatory monitoring, 
hospital and clinical monitoring, and so on, it should also be considered that in some special cases such 
as medical emergencies, or disaster medical management that there may a need to disclosure the 
patient information to many people involved in the rescue activities, so regulations should have some Sensors 2012, 12  
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flexibility and users also have to compromise with their privacy to some extent. The next section 
discusses the existing security mechanisms that can provide security to wireless healthcare applications, 
and ensure patient privacy. 
5. Existing Security Mechanisms  
Security mechanisms are processes that are used to detect, prevent and recover from security 
attacks. Although there are significant security mechanisms for traditional networks (i.e., wired and  
ad hoc) they are generally not directly applicable to resource constrained wireless medical sensor 
networks, so this sub-section discusses the issues concerning existing security mechanisms, as follows: 
5.1. Cryptography  
As wireless medical sensor networks deal with sensitive physiological information, strong 
cryptographic functions (i.e., encryption, authentication, integrity, etc.) are paramount requirements for 
developing any secure healthcare application. These cryptographic functions provide patient privacy 
and security against many malicious attacks. Strong cryptography requires extensive computation and 
resources, therefore selecting appropriate cryptography are a challenging task for resource hungry 
medical sensor nodes that can provides maximum security whilst utilizing the minimum resources. 
Further, the selection of cryptography system depends on the computation and communication 
capability of the sensor nodes. Some argue that asymmetric crypto systems are often too expensive for 
medical sensors and symmetric crypto systems are not versatile enough [79]. However, applying the 
security mechanisms to resource constrained medical sensors should be selected based on the 
following considerations: Energy: how much energy is needed to perform the crypto functions. 
Memory: how much memory (i.e., read only memory and random access memory) is needed for 
security mechanisms. Execution-time: how much time is required to execute the security mechanisms. 
5.2. Key Management 
Key management protocols are fundamental requirements to develop a secure application.   
These protocols are used to set up and distribute various kinds of cryptographic keys to nodes in the 
network. Generally, there are three types of key management protocols, namely, trusted server, key 
pre-distribution and self enforcing [40,80]. (i) Trusted server protocols rely on a trusted base station 
responsible for establishing the key agreement in the network. It is considered that the trusted server 
protocols are well suited to hierarchical networks in the presence of unlimited resource gateways. 
Although, trusted server based schemes provide stronger security to hierarchical networks, in a   
real-time environment, a trusted server could become a single point for the entire network failure; 
hence, they are not suitable for critical applications (e.g., healthcare) [40]. (ii) Key pre-distribution 
protocols are based on symmetric key cryptography, where secret keys are stored in the network before 
the network deployment. The key pre-distribution protocols are easy to implement, and offer relatively 
less computational complexity, making them more suitable for resource constrained sensor networks. 
(iii)  Self enforcing protocols using a public-key infrastructure provide many advantages, such as, 
strong security, scalability, and memory efficiency. Earlier public key based solutions were thought to Sensors 2012, 12  
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be too computationally expensive (i.e., RSA [81] and Diffie-Hellman key exchange [82]) for wireless 
sensor networks. However, some researchers [83-85] have shown that Elliptic curve cryptographic 
based schemes are viable on resource constrained networks. In fact, in real-time implementation, the 
ECC based necessary cryptographic primitives (e.g., signature generation and verification) are still 
expensive in term of the time complexity.  
5.3. Secure Routing 
In home care or disaster scenarios sensor devices might require sending their data to other devices 
outside their immediate radio range [44]. Therefore, routing and message forwarding is a crucial 
service for end-to-end communication. So far, numerous of routing protocols have been proposed for 
sensor networks, but none of them have been designed with strong security as a goal [59,86].   
Karlof-Wagner [61] discussed the fact that routing protocols suffer from many security vulnerabilities, 
such as an attacker might launch denial-of-service attacks on the routing protocol. An attacker could 
also inject malicious routing information into the network, resulting in inconsistencies in the routing. 
Further, most of current proposals are designed for static wireless sensor networks but mobility has not 
been taken under consideration, whereas healthcare applications require mobility supported routing 
protocols. In addition, designing secure routing protocols for mobile networks is a complex task   
and current WMSNs healthcare security requirements will make it more complex when they become 
real-time applications.  
5.4. Resilience to Node Capture 
Resilience against node capture is one of the most challenging problems in sensor networks. In  
real-time healthcare applications, the medical sensors are placed on a patient’s body, whereas, the 
environmental sensors are placed on hospital premises (e.g., ward room, operation room etc.) which 
may be easily accessible to attackers. Thus, an attacker might be able to capture a sensor node, get its 
cryptographic information and alter the sensor programming accordingly. Later, he/she can place the 
compromised node into the network, and that could endanger application success [87]. The current 
cryptographic functions (i.e., node authentication and identification) may detect and defend against 
node compromised attacks to some degree, but these compromised node attacks cannot be detected 
instantly [87], which is a big issue for healthcare application. For example, consider the case of a false 
alarm. One possible solution to prevent this attack is to use tamper resistant hardware; however, 
tamper resistant hardware is not a cost effective solution. 
5.5. Secure Localization 
WMSNs facilitate mobility for patient’s comfort, therefore patient location estimations are needed 
for the success of healthcare applications. Since, medical sensors’ sense physiological data of an 
individual, they also need to report the patient’s location to a remote server. As a result, medical 
sensors have to be aware of patient location, i.e., called localization. In [88] the authors discussed 
localization systems, which were divided into: distance/angle estimation, position computation and Sensors 2012, 12  
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localization algorithms, and further, they discussed attacks on localization systems. In [86,87] the 
authors argue that mobility supported secure localization protocols still need to be explored.  
5.6. Trust Management 
Trust signifies the mutual association of any two trustworthy nodes (i.e., sensor node and data 
aggregator node), that are sharing their information. In [89] trust is defined as “the degree to which a 
node should be trustworthy, secure, or reliable during any interaction with the node”. Wireless 
healthcare applications depend on distributed cooperation among the network nodes. The key aspect of 
healthcare applications is a trust evaluation on the behavior of a node (i.e., data delivery and quality), 
so trust management systems are useful to detect the degree of trust of a node. Boukerche-Ren [89], 
evaluated the trust for mobile healthcare system. However, trust management must still be 
implemented in real-time healthcare application using WMSNs, to ensure a clearer picture of 
trustworthiness of the parties involved (i.e., medical sensors, etc.).  
5.7. Robustness to Communication Denial-of-Services  
An attacker attempts to disrupt the network’s operation by broadcasting high-energy signals. If the 
broadcasting is powerful enough, then the entire network communication might be jammed. Other 
attacks are also possible, such as an adversary may delay communication by violating the medium 
access control protocol. Moreover, an adversary can transmit packets while a neighbor node is also 
transmitting. Raymond-Midkiff [67] has discussed the details of DoS attacks and their countermeasures 
at different layers of WSN routing, as shown in Table 2. Most of the DoS countermeasures are suitable 
for static wireless sensor networks, as shown in Table 3. Since, the WMSN healthcare applications are 
mobile in nature, as a result, secure DoS attack countermeasures still need further investigation for 
real-time healthcare application using WMSNs. 
Table 3. Denial-of-Service attacks and countermeasures at each network layer. 
Network Layer  Attacks  Countermeasures 
Physical layer 
Jamming  Detect and sleep, route around jammed areas
Node tampering  Temper-proof boxing 
Link 
layer/medium 
access control 
Collision, unfairness and  Authentication and anti-replay protection 
Denial of sleep 
Authentication and anti-replay, detect and 
sleep, broadcast attack protection 
Network and 
routing layer 
Neglect and greed, misdirection, spoofing, 
replaying, routing-control traffic or clustering 
Authentication and anti-replay protection, 
Secure cluster formation 
Homing  Header encryption and dummy packets 
Hello floods  Pair-wise authentication, geographic routing
Transport layer 
Flooding SYN  cookies 
De-synchronization Packet  authentication 
Application layer 
Overwhelming sensors  Sensor tuning, data aggregation 
Reprogramming attack 
Authentication and anti-replay protection 
Authentication streams 
Path-based DoS  Authentication and anti-replay protection Sensors 2012, 12  
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As we have seen in the above section there are tremendous robust security mechanisms but these 
mechanisms are not directly applicable to healthcare applications where resource constrained devices 
are used. Consequently, the security gap between the above securities measures are still needs to 
explore for healthcare applications.  
6. Security and Privacy Requirements of Healthcare Applications 
Based on the above application scenarios, security issues and regulatory laws, this section points 
out the paramount security and privacy requirements for healthcare applications using wireless medical 
sensor networks, as follows: 
(1) Data  confidentiality:  Patient health data are generally held under the legal and ethical 
obligations of confidentiality. These health data should be confidential and available only to 
the authorized doctors or other caregivers. Thus, it is important to keep the individual health 
information confidential, so that an adversary cannot eavesdrop on the patient’s information. 
Data eavesdropping may cause damage to the patient because the adversary can use the 
patient’s data for many illegal purposes and hence, the patient’s privacy is breached. 
Therefore, data confidentiality is an important requirement in healthcare applications using 
WMSNs.  
(2)  Data authentication: Authentication services provide authorization, which is necessary for 
both medical and non-medical applications. In WMSN healthcare applications, authentication 
is a must for every medical sensor and the base-station to verify that the data were sent by a 
trusted sensor or not.  
(3)  Strong user authentication: The major problem in a wireless healthcare environment is 
vulnerability of wireless messages to an unauthorized user, so it is highly desirable that strong 
user authentication should be considered, whereby each user must prove their authenticity 
before accessing any patient physiological information. Furthermore, strong user 
authentication, also known as two-factor authentication, provides greater security for 
healthcare applications using wireless medical sensor networks [78]. 
(4)  Data integrity: Data integrity services guarantee at the recipient end that the data has not been 
altered in transit by an adversary. Due to the broadcast nature of the sensor network, the 
patient’s information could be altered by an adversary; this could be very dangerous in the 
case of life-critical events. To verify the data integrity, one must have the ability to identify 
any data manipulation done by illegal parties. Thus, proper data integrity mechanisms ensure 
that the received data has not been altered by an adversary. 
(5) Key  distribution: If two parties exchange information, they must share a session key and that 
key must be protected from others. A secure session key helps secure subsequent 
communication and safeguards data against various security attacks. Thus in order to preserve 
the patient’s privacy, an efficient key distribution scheme is a major requirement in wireless 
healthcare applications [90].  
(6)  Access control: In healthcare application many users (such as doctors, nurses, pharmacists, 
insurance companies, lab staff, social workers, etc.) are always directly involved with the 
patient’s physiological data, so it is highly desirable that a role-based access control Sensors 2012, 12  
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mechanism should be implemented in real-time healthcare applications that can restrict the 
access of the physiological information, as user’s roles. For example, the HL7 Standard 
Development Organization uses a role-based access control model [91].  
(7)  Data availability: Availability ensures that services and information can be accessed at the 
time when they are required. Thus, medical sensor node availability ensures that the patient’s 
data are constantly available to the caregiver. If a sensor node is captured by an adversary, 
then its data availability will be lost, thus it is required to maintain always-on the operation of 
the healthcare applications in the case of loss of availability.  
(8)  Data freshness: In healthcare applications, data confidentiality and integrity are not enough if 
data freshness is not considered. Data freshness implies that the patient physiological signs 
are fresh or resent; and thus an adversary has not replayed the old messages. There are two 
kinds of freshness: weak freshness, which gives partial message ordering but does not carry 
time-delay information; and strong freshness, gives a total order on a request-response pair 
and allows for delay estimation [92]. 
(9)  Secure localization: In healthcare applications, estimation of the patient’s location is very 
important. In real-time applications, a lack of smart patient tracking allows an attacker to send 
incorrect patient’s location by using false signals [92]. 
(10)  Forward and backward secrecy: In a real-time healthcare application, generally new medical 
sensors are deployed when old sensors fail, so it is important to consider forward and 
backward secrecy. In forward secrecy, a medical sensor cannot read future messages 
transmitted after it leaves the network, while in backward secrecy a sensor joining the 
network cannot read any previously transmitted messages [93]. 
(11) Communication and computation cost: Since wireless medical sensors are resource 
constrained devices, and healthcare application’s functions also need room for executing their 
tasks, the security schemes must be efficient in terms of the communication and 
computational cost. 
(12) Patient permission: A patient’s permission is needed when a healthcare provider is 
disseminating his/her health records to another healthcare consultant. For example, medical 
researcher, insurance company, etc. 
In addition, patient’s anonymity is also needed for healthcare applications because medical sensor 
networks are wireless in nature. Thus anonymity hides the source of a packet (i.e., medical sensor data) 
during wireless communication. It is a service that can enable confidentiality. Further, a wireless 
healthcare application should enable minimum survivability in the presence of power loss, failures or 
attacks. 
7. Related Works 
This section discusses the recently published literature on secure healthcare monitoring using 
wireless sensor networks. In [9] Muhammed et al. proposed a biometric based distributed key 
management protocol, named BARI+, for wireless body area networks. The BARI+ architecture 
consists of a PS (personal server), MS (medical server), and WBAN (wireless body area network). In 
their scheme the WBAN is managed by four keys, namely, communication key, administrative key, Sensors 2012, 12  
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basic key, and secret key that shared by sensor node and medical database/server. The BARI+ protocol 
is divided into three phases: (i) initial deployment phase: all initial keys are deployed in the PS, MS 
and WBAN in this phase; (ii) re-keying phase: in order to refresh the communication key, PS 
computes a value from the patient’s biometrics, encrypts it, and broadcasts it into the network; and  
(iii) node addition phase: if a new node is added then the MS informs the PS about new deployments 
by sending identities, basic keys and other relevant information of the new node to the PS. Further, the 
authors claim that their protocol facilitates many security services such as confidentiality, 
authentication, and security against replay attacks, forward secrecy, security against node compromise 
and security against routing attacks. Muhammed et al. simulated their scheme for Mica2 mote and they 
used RC5 block cipher for confidentiality and SHA-1 for hashing.  
Waluyo et al. [32] proposed a lightweight middleware for personal wireless body area networks. 
The idea of the proposed middleware is to simplify and accelerate the development of wireless 
healthcare applications by using highly reusable codes. The middleware architecture has the following 
features: data acquisition, on-the-fly sensor reconfiguration, plug-and-play capabilities and resource 
management. In addition, it also provides security to protect critical sensor data from unauthorized 
parties. The authors choose SkipJack 64-bit lightweight block cipher cryptosystem for confidentiality, 
which consumes 622 bytes of ROM. For the performance evaluation three BSN accelerometers and 
one ECG were used as a prototype. The proposed middleware resides in a personal digital assistant 
(PDA). 
Huang  et al. [56] proposed secure access to a hierarchical sensor-based healthcare monitoring 
architecture. The healthcare architecture is composed of three network tiers (sensor, mobile, and   
back-end network) and has been demonstrated for three different pervasive healthcare applications  
(in-hospital, in-home, and nursing-home). In the sensor network tier, a wearable sensor system (WSS) 
using Bluetooth and integrated with biomedical sensors is used to monitor the vital signals of 
individuals. Wireless sensor motes [WSMs (i.e., Mica2)] are placed within the building to collect the 
environmental parameters. WSS and WSM securely broadcast physiological information and 
environmental parameters to the upper layer. WSS uses an advance encryption standard (AES) based 
authentication (i.e., CBC-MAC) and an encryption scheme, while the WSMs use a polynomial-based 
encryption scheme to establish secure point-to-point communication between two WSM motes. A 
public-key based key establishment protocol is used to establish the secure keys. In the mobile 
computing network tier, mobile computing devices (MCD) such as PDAs organized as in an ad-hoc 
network, route the data via multi-hops to the local station. MCD has the computational capabilities 
required to analyze the WSS and WSM data. A mobile-to-mobile text-based alarm message is used to 
show any real time abnormalities. Every MCD supports secure short message service (SMS) using 
cellular networks. Further, the authors used the ARAN routing protocol which is based on an Ad Hoc 
On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol for ad-hoc networks. The back-end tier is 
structured with a fixed station and server that provide application level services for lower tiers and 
process various sensing data. Although, the authors implemented the ARAN routing protocol in 
healthcare applications, their study did not show the different effects, e.g., energy consumption, 
memory requirements, etc. Therefore more analysis is needed to implement the secure routing 
protocols in the real-time healthcare applications. Furthermore, the authors claim that their scheme 
provides confidentiality, authentication and integrity.  Sensors 2012, 12  
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Muraleedharan-Osadciw [60] proposed a secure health monitoring network against denial-of-service 
attacks using cognitive intelligence. They proposed energy-efficient cognitive routing protocol that 
copes with the Sybil and worm-hole attacks for healthcare applications. 
Le  et al. [79] proposed a MAACE protocol where an authorized professional can access the 
patient’s data. Their scheme provides mutual authentication and access control, which is based on elliptic 
curve cryptography (ECC). Furthermore, the authors claim their scheme can defend from real-time 
attacks, such as replay attacks, and denial-of-service attacks. The MAACE architecture is composed of 
three layers, namely, a sensor network layer (SN), a coordination network layer (CN), and a data 
access layer (DA). In this scheme, the SN transmits data to the CN (i.e., PDA, laptop or cell phone), 
later, the data is forwarded to the DA for future records. Although, Le et al.’s protocol provides 
enough security, it is susceptible to information-leakage attacks, which could be dangerous for a 
patient’s privacy. As a result, the patient’s vital signs are exposed to unauthorized users, which is not 
acceptable for real-time healthcare applications. 
Malasri et al. [83] implemented a secure wireless mote-base medical sensor network for health care 
applications. Their scheme has three main components: (a) A two tier scheme is used for data 
authentication based on the patient’s biometric and physiological data. (b) An ECC-based secure key 
exchange protocol is used to set up shared keys between the medical sensor and the base station. (c) A 
symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm is used for data confidentiality and integrity. Their security 
mechanism is as follows: each medical mote (Motive T-mote) is connected with a small fingerprint 
scanner. The patient’s identity is verified by the base station via the patient’s biometric signature. The 
query and patient data are encrypted using RC5 block cipher cryptosystem and data integrity is 
provided by a Hashed message authentication code (H-MAC). An elliptic curve cryptographic (ECC) 
based key exchange protocol is used between the medical sensor and the base station. Further, the 
scheme consumes 24.7 KB of ROM and 2.8 KB of RAM, and ECC operation takes 5.3 seconds for 
key exchange. Their scheme is secure against spoofing and physical compromise of motes, and 
provides confidentiality, authentication and integrity.  
Boukerche-Ren [89] proposed a secure mobile healthcare system using a trust-based multicast 
scheme. A multicast strategy is used that employs trust to evaluate the behavior of each node. By doing 
so, only trustworthy nodes are permitted to participate in communications, while the misbehavior of 
malicious nodes identifies them and they are successfully prevented from communicating. The authors 
have brought forth a new trust evaluation theory whereby a node is only allowed to join the 
communication initiated by the source node when this new node is trustworthy for the source node.  
Misic  et al. [90] proposed two key distribution algorithms for enforcing patient privacy in 
healthcare WSNs through the use of key distribution algorithms. In the first algorithm, a central trusted 
security server is used to authenticate the participants that belong to the patient group and generate a 
session key. Four entities are involved in clinical system, namely, patient, clinician, nurse and central 
authority. In the second algorithm, an independent certificate is used for participant authentication, 
which is based on public key cryptography. The authentication is accomplished through the following 
steps: certificate generation; exchange of challenges; request of control coordinator (CTSS); base point 
distribution; confirmation of the reception of base point; and symmetric key generation. For detailed 
specifications the reader may refer to [90]. The authors proposed and analyzed two key distribution 
algorithms but they did not simulate or implement them in a real-time environment. Sensors 2012, 12  
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Haque  et al. [94] proposed an efficient security scheme for patient monitoring systems using 
wireless sensor networks. Their scheme uses a public key based infrastructure, and is composed of 
three main components: patient (PT), healthcare service system (HSS), and secure base stations 
(SBSs). A pseudo-inverse matrix is used to derive a pair-wise shared key, and a bilateral key 
handshaking method is used to establish secure communication between HSS and SBS or PT and SBS. 
Because SBS has prior knowledge of the secret keys of PTs and HSSs, any node PT in the network can 
establish secure PT-to-SBS communication or vice versa. In addition, their scheme provides data 
confidentiality (i.e., encryption and decryption). 
Hu  et al. [95] proposed a software and hardware based real-time cardiac patient healthcare 
monitoring system known as tele-cardiology sensor network (TSN). TSN is specially designed for the 
U.S. healthcare community, and performs real time healthcare data collection for elderly patients in 
large nursing homes. In TSN, a patient’s ECG signals are automatically collected and processed by 
small ECG sensors and transmitted wirelessly to an ECG server for further analysis. TSN is composed 
of a large number of wireless ECG communication units; each unit is called a mobile platform. In 
order to protect the patient privacy, TSN facilitates confidentiality (i.e., only source and destination 
can recognize the medical data, who has knowledge of secret keys), and integrity (i.e., no data is 
altered during the wireless communication). Further, to achieve the energy-efficiency cluster based 
routing is used. Intra-cluster security, skipjack block cipher cryptography algorithm used to protect 
patient physiological (i.e., ECG data), and an inter-cluster security uses pre-distributed session keys. 
For multiple patients, cluster based routing used to reduce the patient-to-doctor routing overhead, and 
achieved efficiency. Their security scheme consumes 26 mJ (milli-joules) for data processing, 1,002 mJ 
for radio communication, and 11 mJ for memory accesses. For more details the reader may refer to [95]. 
Dagtas et al. [96] proposed another real time and secure architecture for health monitoring in smart 
homes using ZigBee technology. The proposed framework has the following features: (a) the ability to 
detect signals wirelessly within a body area sensor network (BSN); (b) low-power and reliable data 
transmission using ZigBee technology; (c) secure transmission of medical data over BSN; (d) efficient 
channel allocation over wireless networks, and (e) optimized analysis of data using an adaptive 
framework that maximizes the processing and computational capacity. A secure key management 
protocol used to establish secure session keys in body sensor networks because it provides cryptographic 
keys that facilitate security services, e.g., confidentiality, authentication, and data integrity. An 
authentication algorithm is used between the body sensors and the handheld device of the mobile 
patient. However, the authors provide security to physiological data, but they did not discuss which 
symmetric cryptosystem they have used, and did not analyze the energy efficiency for security services. 
Kang et al. [97] proposed a wearable context-aware system for ubiquitous healthcare. The proposed 
context-aware system is composed of wearable sensor systems, wearable computers and communication 
modules. The wearable sensors are connected to wearable computers via ZigBee communication. The 
wearable sensor system has two types of sensor, i.e., a watch type sensor and a chest belt type sensor. 
Wearable computers, e.g., PDAs, are used to collect the sensors’ data. ZigBee technology is used for 
communication between the wearable sensors and PDAs. A wireless local area network (LAN) with 
802.11b (Wi-Fi) is used for communication between PDAs and healthcare service providers on the 
Internet. 
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Lin  et al [98] proposed a strong privacy-preserving scheme against global eavesdropping for 
eHealth systems known as SAGE. The system achieves content oriented privacy and contextual 
privacy against a strong global adversary. The content oriented privacy applies if a malevolent user has 
the capability to disclose a patient’s data while data is being transmitted on wireless channels by 
observing and manipulating it. If not, then content oriented privacy is achieved. The contextual privacy 
stated that if a malicious user has the ability to link the data source (i.e., patient) and the destination 
(i.e., doctor/central server) of a message, then there is a contextual privacy breach. The functions of 
SAGE include system settings, patient registration, patient health information transmission and patient 
health information collection. The basic idea of SAGE is that a patient information database (PIDB) 
receives the personal health information (PHI) from patient’s body sensors (e.g., accelerometer, blood 
pressure, oxygen saturation, and temperature sensors); it broadcasts the PHI to all physicians. Then 
only the applicable physician has access to the patient’s PHI. In this system, all PHI information’s are 
stored in the PIDB at the eHealth center. To achieve access control, only registered patients can store 
their data and only legal physicians can retrieve patients’ data from the PIDB. Authors have proposed 
elliptic curve cryptography based privacy solution and demonstrate a formal proof for the proposed 
solution against strong eavesdropping. For more details refer to [98]. 
Kumar  et al. [99] proposed a secure health monitoring (SHM) using medical wireless sensor 
networks. SHM provides security services such as confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity to the 
patient data at low computation and communication cost. The proposed scheme has the following 
components: (a) the ability to detect ECG signals wirelessly within the patient body, (b) low-power 
and reliable data transmission using Telos-B technology. In SHM, the confidentiality is achieved   
by PingPong-128 stream cipher cryptography, and authentication and integrity are achieved by   
PingPong-MAC,  i.e., message authentication code. Further, the proposed SHM consumes 1.1 KB 
RAM, 17.4 KB ROM and 19.2 ms CPU computation time.  
Wu et al. [100] proposed an adaptive fault-tolerant communication scheme, named as AFTCS, for 
body sensor networks. AFTCS provide reliable data transmission for critical sensors by reserving 
channel bandwidth according to the amount of human physiological data, the external environment and 
the system itself.  
As we have seen in this section, significant research has been conducted in order to secure 
healthcare applications using wireless medical sensor networks. It is obvious that extensive security 
and privacy research is needed in wireless healthcare application, which can fill the security gaps that 
we have discussed in the above sections.  
8. Discussion  
Wireless medical sensor networks make patients’ life more comfortable and provide viable 
solutions for healthcare applications such as vital sign monitoring, hospitals, home care, ambulatory 
care, clinical monitoring. The success of wireless healthcare absolutely depends on security as well. 
Security in healthcare application using wireless medical sensor networks is an emerging research 
topic and it is worth studying. This paper provides a fairly comprehensive study of security research in 
healthcare application using WMSNs.  Sensors 2012, 12  
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In wireless healthcare, patient health data floats on wireless communication, so malevolent users 
must not be underestimated. Since wireless communication ranges are not confined, malevolent threats 
even pose more significant risks to the patient. For example a patient’s body data can be accessed in an 
unauthorized manner, can be modified, and consequently this can pose a life-threatening risk. 
Currently, appears that researchers have limited awareness of the patient risks. Most of the popular 
research projects acknowledge the issue of security, but they fail to implement strong security services 
that could preserve patient privacy (cf. Section 2), e.g., CodeBlue [7], Alarm-Net [13], UbiMon [14], 
MobiCare [16,53], STAIRE [55]. As result, a healthcare provider using [7,13,14,16,53,55] a system 
that permitted malevolent or others user to access the health data could be held liable for violating the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [39].  
However, upcoming work is required in particular to consider the security and privacy issues for 
such applications where people life’s at high risk. To maintain strong security in a real-time healthcare 
application, security and privacy needs to be included from the starting point of application design, 
deployment, and implementation. 
HIPAA regulated stringent rules for healthcare providers (cf. Section 4), i.e., individuals’ vital signs 
are exposed to authorized professionals (i.e., doctors, caregivers and nurses) [39,78]. A strong user 
authentication (i.e., professional authentication) protocol at the application layer has not yet been 
addressed effectively in order to prevent illegal access to wireless medical sensor data, so user 
authentication is highly desirable in such wireless healthcare applications.  
The aim of wireless healthcare is to let patient to survive when he/she is alone or wants to live an 
independent life, so mobility of the patient must be maintained, therefore there is need of such a 
security mechanism that can quickly adapt to dynamic topologies. However, little research deals with 
dynamic topologies, such as Alarm-Net, where the project is platform dependent. It could not support a 
secure handover mechanism to another network device, if a patient moves from a home network to a 
foreign network. So, future researchers or projects might pay attention to securing patient mobility 
while he/she is moving from network to network.  
Researchers also have to carefully consider communication overhead, because any security 
protocols add computation and communication overhead. Since a high throughput is essential for health 
data, security protocols should be cost effective in terms of computation and communication costs.  
Wireless healthcare applications need time for a synchronization protocol to compute end-to-end 
delay of packets for real-time analysis. Thus, the healthcare monitoring applications should be time 
synchronized that compute the end-to-end time delay between the medical sensors and the base-
stations. More specifically, the time synchronization is more important for patient location tracking 
because patients’ body sensors need to do collaborative work such as sensing tasks, patient tracking, 
data routing and data aggregation. However, in healthcare application none of the aforementioned time 
synchronization schemes were designed with security in mind.  
Furthermore, it is very clear that there are plenty of unsolved research needs special attention to 
explore security (recall Section 5) in healthcare application using WMSNs, as follows:  
(1) Public key cryptography: Recent studies have revealed that public key operation may be 
practical in medical sensors. But private key operations are still too expensive in term of time 
complexity, so the efficiency of private key operations still needs to be explored. Moreover, the Sensors 2012, 12  
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authenticity of public key is highly desirable, e.g., suppose a body sensor receives a public key 
from a server, then there is the need to check the authenticity of the public key (i.e., real or 
fake). In [56,93] the authors did not consider public key authentication. Since healthcare 
applications deal with sensitive patient data, in future, researchers should be mindful of the 
authenticity of public keys. 
(2) Symmetric key cryptography: Although, symmetric key cryptography is easy to implement and 
superior to asymmetric key cryptography (i.e., public and private key) in terms of time 
complexity and energy cost, the demerit of symmetric key cryptography for medical sensor 
networks is that, it is not perfect for key distribution. Therefore, efficient and flexible key 
distribution protocols need to be designed for healthcare application using WMSNs. 
(3) Secure routing: Generally, most current secure routing protocols are designed for stationary 
networks, whereas medical sensor networks provides mobility to their patients and demands for 
mobility-supported multi-hop routing protocols [7,54,56,57]. Recalling the project described  
in [7], CodeBlue uses TinyADMR routing which is susceptible to routing loop attacks, grey-
hole attacks, and Sybil attacks [49], so secure routing needs special attention for future wireless 
healthcare research.  
(4)  Security and quality-of-service (QoS): Most healthcare studies consider security as an 
individual topic, whereas QoS [101-104] with security could become a tradeoff for healthcare 
applications using medical sensor networks, so security and QoS need to be evaluated jointly.  
9. Conclusions  
This survey discussed the security and privacy issues in healthcare applications using medical 
sensor networks. It has been shown that a well-planned security mechanism must be designed for the 
successful deployment of such a wireless application. In this respect, we have found many important 
challenges in implementing a secure healthcare monitoring system using medical sensors, which 
reflects the fact that if a technology is safe, then people will trust it. Otherwise, its use will not be 
practical, and could even endanger the patient’s life. Consequently, many security and privacy issues 
in healthcare applications using wireless medical sensor networks still need to be explored and we 
hope that this survey will motivate future researchers to come up with more robust security 
mechanisms for real-time healthcare applications.  
Acknowledgment 
This research was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research 
Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (Grant 
Numbers: 2011-0004833 and 2011-0023076). 
We are very thankful to anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions for making this 
valuable survey, which helps to the future researchers. Sensors 2012, 12  
 
 
85
References  
1.  Ko, B.J.G.; Lu, C.; Srivastva, M.B.; Stankovic, J.A.; Terzis, A.; Welsh, M. Wireless Sensor 
Network for Healthcare. Proc. IEEE 2010, 98, 1947-1960. 
2.  An Aging World. Available online: http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p95-09-1.pdf 
(accessed on 2 October 2011). 
3.  Alzheimer’s Disease. Available online: http://www.nia.nih.gov/NR/rdonlyres/7DCA00DB-1362-
4755-9E87-96DF669EAE20/18196/ADFACTSHEET.pdf (accessed on 7 October 2011). 
4.  Aging Heart and Arteries, A scientific Quest. Available online: http://www.nia.nih.gov/ 
NR/rdonlyres/0BBF820F-27D0-48EA-9820-736B7E9F08BB/0/HAFinal_0601.pdf (accessed on 
7 October 2011). 
5.  Gaddam, A.; Mukhopadhyay, S.C.; Gupta, G.S. Elder Care Based on Cognitive Sensor Network. 
IEEE Sensors J. 2011, 11, 574-581. 
6.  Chung, W.Y.; Walia, G.; Lee, Y.D.; Myllyla, R. Design Issues and Implementation of   
Query-Driven Healthcare System Using Wireless Sensor Ad Hoc Network. In Proceedings of 4th 
International Workshop on Wearable and Implantable Body Sensor Network (BSN 2007), 
Aachen, Germany, 26–28 March 2007. 
7.  Malan, D.; Jones, T.F.; Welsh, M.; Moulton, S. CodeBlue: An Ad-Hoc Sensor Network 
Infrastructure for Emergency Medical Care. In Proceedings of the MobiSys 2004 Workshop on 
Applications of Mobile Embedded Systems (WAMES 2004), Boston, MA, USA, 6–9 June 2004. 
8.  Dimitriou, T.; Loannis, K. Security Issues in Biomedical Wireless Sensor Networks.   
In  Proceedings of 1st International Symposium on Applied Sciences on Biomedical and 
Communication Technologies (ISABEL’08), Aalborg, Denmark, 25–28 October 2008. 
9.  Muhammad, K.R.R.S.; Lee, H.; Lee, S.; Lee, Y.K. BARI+: A Biometric Based Distributed Key 
Management Approach for Wireless Body Area Networks. Sensors 2010, 10, 3911-3933. 
10.  Alonso, J.V.; Matencio, P.L.; Castano, F.J.G.; Hellin, H.N.; Guirao, P.J.B.; Martinez, F.J.P.; 
Alvarez, R.P.M.; Jimenez, D.G.; Castineira, F.G.; Fernandez, R.D. Ambient Intelligence Systems 
for Personalized Sport Training. Sensors 2010, 10, 2359-2385. 
11.  Chen, B.R.; Peterson, G.; Mainland, G.; Welsh, M. LiveNet: Using Passive Monitoring to 
Reconstruct Sensor Network Dynamics. In Proceedings of the 4th IEEE International 
Conference on Distributed Computing in Sensor System (DCOSS’08), Santorini Island, Greece, 
11–14 June 2008.  
12.  Halteren, A.V.; Bults, R.; Wac, K.; Konstantas, D.; Widya, I.; Dokovsky, N.; Koprinkon, G.; 
Jones, V.; Jerzog, R. Mobile Patient Monitoring: The MobiHealth System. J. Inform. Tech. 
Healthcare 2004, 2, 365-373. 
13.  Wood, A.; Virone, G.; Doan, T.; Cao, Q.; Selavo, L.; Wu, Y.; Fang, L.; He, Z.; Lin, S.; 
Stankovic, J. ALARM-NET: Wireless Sensor Networks for Assisted-Living and Residential 
Monitoring; Technical Report CS-2006-01; Department of Computer Science, University of 
Virginia: Charlottesville, VA, USA, 2006. Sensors 2012, 12  
 
 
86
14.  Ng, J.W.P.; Lo, B.P.L.; Wells, O.; Sloman, M.; Peters, N.; Darzi, A.; Toumazou, C.; Yang, G.-Z. 
Ubiquitous Monitoring Environment for Wearable and Implantable Sensors (UbiMon).   
In  Proceedings of 6th International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp’04), 
Nottingham, UK, 7–14 September 2004.  
15.  Fischer, M.; Lim, Y.Y.; Lawernce, E.; Ganguli, L.K. ReMoteCase: Health Monitoring with 
Streaming Video. In Proceedings of 7th International Conference on Mobile Business, Barcelona, 
Spain, 7–8 July 2008; pp. 280-286. 
16.  Chakravorty, R. A Programmable Service Architecture for Mobile Medical Care. In Proceedings 
of 4th Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communication 
Workshop (PERSOMW’06), Pisa, Italy, 13–17 March 2006. 
17.  Rajasekaran, M.P.; Radhakrishnan, S.; Subbaraj, P. Sensor Grid Applications in Patient 
Monitoring. Future Generat. Comput. Syst. 2010, 26, 569-575. 
18.  Montgomery, K.; Mundt, C.; Thonier, G.; Tellier, A.; Udoh, U.; Barker, V.; Ricks, R.; 
Giovangrandi, L.; Davies, P.; Cagle, Y.; Swain, J.; Hines, J.; Kovacs, G. Lifeguard—A Personal 
Physiological Monitor for Extreme Environments. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual 
International Conference of the IEEE EMBS, San Francisco, CA, USA, 1–5 September 2004;  
pp. 2192-2195. 
19.  Gao, T.; Massey, T.; Selavo, L.; Crawford, D.; Chen, B.R.; Lorincz, K.; Shnayder, V.; 
Hauenstein, L.; Dabiri, F.; Jeng, J.; Chanmugam, A.; White, D.; Sarrafzadeh, M.; Welsh, M. The 
Advanced Health and Disaster Aid Network: A Light-Weight Wireless Medical System for 
Triage. IEEE Trans. Biomed. Circ. Syst.2007, 1, 203-216. 
20.  Jiang, S.; Cao, Y.; Iyengar, S.; Kuryloski, P.; Jafari, R.; Xue, Y.; Bajcsy, R.; Wicker, S.; CareNet: 
An Integrated Wireless Sensor Networking Environment for Remote Healthcare.   
In Proceedings of 8th International Conference on Body Area Networks, Brussels, Belgium,   
13–15 March 2008. 
21.  Mahmoud, A.S.; Sheltami, T.R.; Amara, M.H.A. Wireless Sensor Network Implementation for 
Mobile Patient. In Proceedings of International Conference on Grid and Cooperative Computing, 
Manama, Bahrain, 20–22 March 2006. 
22.  Farella, E.; Pieracci, A.; Brunelli, D.; Benini, L.; Ricco, B.; Acquaviva, A. Design and 
Implementation of WiMoCA Node for a Body Area Wireless Sensor Network. In Proceedings of 
System Communication, Montreal, QC, Canada, 14–17 August 2005; pp. 342-347. 
23.  Nee, O.; Hein, A.; Gorath, T.; Hulsmann, N.; Laleci, G.B.; Yuksel, M.; Olduz, M.; Tasyurt, I.; 
Orhan, U.; Dogac, A.; Fruntelata, A.; Ghiorghe, S.; Ludwig, R. SAPHIRE: Intelligent Healthcare 
Monitoring Based on Semantic Interoperability Platform: Pilot Applications. IET Commun. 2008, 
2, 192-201. 
24.  Han, D.; Lee, M.; Park, S. THE-MUSS: Mobile u-Health Service System. Biomed. Eng. Syst. 
Tech. 2009, 25, 377-389. 
25.  Koch, S.; Hagglund, M. Health Informatics and the Delivery of Care to Older People. Maturitas 
2009, 63, 195-199. 
26.  Chung, W.Y.; Yan, C.; Shin, K. A Cell Phone Based Health Monitoring System with Self 
Analysis Processing Using Wireless Sensor Network Technology. In Proceedings of 29th Annual 
International Conference on the IEEE EMBS, Lyon, France, 23–26 August 2007. Sensors 2012, 12  
 
 
87
27.  Gravina, R.; Guerrieri, A.; Fortino, G.; Bellifemine, F. Giannantonio, R.; Sgroi, M. Development 
of Body Sensor Network Application Using SPINE. In Proceedings of IEEE International 
Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics (SMC 2008), Singapore, 12–15 October 2008. 
28.  Lorincz, K.; Chen, B.; Challen, G.W.; Chowdhury, A.R.; Patel, S.; Bonato, P.; Welsh, M. 
Mercurty: A Wearable Sensor Network Platform for High-Fidelity Motion Analysis.   
In Proceedings of 7th ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys’09), 
Berkeley, CA, USA, 4–6 November 2009.  
29.  Lee, S.C.; Lee, Y.D.; Chung, W.Y. Design and Implementation of Reliable Query Process for 
Indoor Environmental and Healthcare Monitoring System. In Proceedings of International 
Conference on Convergence and Hybrid Information Technology (ICHIT’08), Daejeon, Korea, 
28–30 August 2008; pp. 398-402. 
30.  Omeni, O.; Eljamaly, O.; Burdett, A. Energy-Efficient Medium Access Protocol for Wireless 
Medical Body Area Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of 4th IEEE/EMBS International Summer 
School and Symposium on Medical Devices and Biosensors, Cambridge, UK, 19–22 August 
2007; pp. 29-32. 
31.  Lamprinos, I.E.; Prentza, A.; Sakka, E.; Koutsouris, D. Energy-Efficient MAC Protocol of 
Patients Personal Area Networks. In Proceedings of 27th Annual International Conference of the 
IEEE EMBS, Shanghai, China, 1–4 September 2005; pp. 3799-3802.  
32.  Waluyo, A.B.; Pek, I.; Chen, X.; Yeoh, W.-S. Design and Evaluation of Lightweight Middleware 
for Personal Wireless Body Area Network. Pers. Ubiquit. Comput. 2009, 13, 509-525. 
33.  Xiao, Y.; Shen, X.; Sun, B.; Cai, L. Security and Privacy in RFID and Applications in 
Telemedicine. IEEE Commun. Mag. 2006, 44, 64-72. 
34.  Venkatasubramaniam, K.K.; Gupta, S.K.S. Security for Pervasive Health Monitoring Sensor 
Applications. In Proceedings of 4th International Conference on Intelligent Sensing and 
Information Processing (ICPSIP 2006), Bangalore, India, 15–18 December 2006; pp. 197-202. 
35.  Leon, M.D.L.A.C.; Garcia, J.L. A Security and Privacy Survey for WSN in e-Health Application. 
In Proceedings of Conference on Electronics, Robotics and Automotive Mechanics (CERMA’09), 
Cuernavaca, Morelos, Mexico, 22–25 September 2009; pp. 125-130. 
36.  Halperin, D.; Benjamin, T.S.H.; Fu, K.; Kohno, T.; Maisel, W.H. Security and Privacy for 
Implantable Medical Devices. Pervas. Comput. 2008, 7, 30-39. 
37.  Meingast, M.; Roosta, T.; Sastry, S. Security and Privacy Issues with Healthcare Information 
Technology. In Proceedings of the 28th IEEE EMBS Annual International Conference, New 
York, NY, USA, 31 August–3 September 2006; pp. 5453-5458. 
38.  Kotz, D. A Threat Taxonomy for mHealth Privacy. In Proceedings of Workshop on Networked 
Healthcare Technology (NetHealth), Bangalore, India, 4 January 2011.  
39.  Office for Civil Rights, United State Department of Health and Human Services. Medical 
Privacy. National Standards of Protect the Privacy of Personal-Health-Information. Available 
online: http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html (accessed on 
15 June 2011). 
40.  Ng, H.S.; Sim, M.L.; Tan, C.M. Security Issues of Wireless Sensor Networks in Healthcare 
Applications. BT Tech. J. 2006, 24, 138-144. Sensors 2012, 12  
 
 
88
41.  Weippl, E.; Holzinger, A.; Tjoa, A.M. Security Aspects of Ubiquitous Computing in Healthcare. 
Available online: http://www.springerlink.com/content/et5gt8088j388115/fulltext.pdf (accessed 
on 10 June 2011). 
42.  Ameen, M.A.; Liu, J.; Kwak, K. Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks for 
Healthcare Applications. J. Med. Syst. 2010, doi: 10.1007/s10916-010-9449-4. 
43.  Misic, J.; Misic, V.B. Security Issues in Wireless Sensor Networks Used in Clinical Information 
Systems. Wirel. Netw. Secur. Sign. Commun. Tech. 2007, doi: 10.1007/978-0-387-33112-6_13. 
44.  Lorincz, K.; Malan, D.J.; Fulford-Jones, T.R.F.; Nawoj, A.; Clavel, A.; Shayder, V.; Mainland, G.; 
Welsh, M. Sensor Networks for Emergency Response: Challenges and Opportunities. Pervas. 
Comput. 2004, 3, 16-23.  
45.  Mica2datasheet. Available online: https://www.eol.ucar.edu/rtf/facilities/isa/internal/CrossBow/ 
DataSheets/mica2.pdf (accessed on 7 October 2011). 
46.  Lorincz, K.; Welsh, M. MoteTrack: A Robust, Decentralized Approach to RF-Based Location 
Tracking. Pers. Ubiquit. Comput. 2006, 11, 489-503.  
47.  Liu, A.; Ning, P. TinyECC: A Configurable Library for Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Wireless 
Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Processing 
in Sensor Networks, St. Louis, MO, USA, 22–24 April 2008; pp. 245-256.  
48.  Karlof, C.; Sastry, N.; Wagner, D. TinySec: A Link Layer Security Architecture for Wireless 
Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Embedded Networked 
Sensor Systems, Baltimore, MD, USA, 3–5 November 2004; pp. 162-175. 
49.  Kambourakis, G.; Kaloudatou, E.; Gritzalis, S. Securing Medical Sensor Environments: The 
CodeBlue Framework Case. In Proceedings of 2nd International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability and Security (ARES’07), Vienna, Austria, 10–13 April 2007.  
50.  MicaZ Datasheet. Available online: http://www.openautomation.net/uploadsproductos/ 
micaz_datasheet.pdf (accessed on 7 October 2011). 
51.  Telos Datasheet. Available online: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~konrad/References/ 
TinyOSDocs/telos-reva-datasheet-r.pdf (accessed on 7 October 2011). 
52.  Pai, S.; Meingast, M.; Roosta, T.; Bermudez, S.; Wicker, S.; Mulligan, D.K.; Sastry, S. 
Confidentiality in Sensor Networks: Transactional Information. IEEE Security and Privacy 
Magazine 2008. 
53.  Blum, J.M.; Magill, E.H. The Design and Evaluation of Personalised Ambient Mental Health 
Monitors. In Proceedings of IEEE CCNC 2010, Las Vegas, NV, USA, 9–12 January 2010. 
54.  Ko, J.; Lim, J.H.; Chen, Y.; Musaloiu-E., R.; Terzis, A.; Masson, G.M. MEDiSN: Medical 
Emergency Detection in Sensor Networks. ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst. 2010, 10, 1-29. 
55.  Ganti, R.K.; Jayachandran, P.; Abdelzaher, T.F.; Stankovic, J.A. SATIRE: A Software 
Architecture for Smart AtTIRE. In Proceedings of MobiSys’06, Uppsala, Sweden, 19–22 June 
2006; pp. 110-123. 
56.  Huang, Y.M.; Hsieh, M.Y.; Hung, H.C.; Park, J.H. Pervasive, Secure Access to a Hierarchical 
Sensor-Based Healthcare Monitoring Architecture in Wireless Heterogeneous Networks. IEEE J. 
Select. Areas Commun. 2009, 27, 400-411. 
57.  Hande, A.; Polk, T.; Walker, W.; Bhatia, D. Self-Powered Wireless Sensor Networks for Remote 
Patient Monitoring in Hospitals. Sensors 2006, 6, 1102-1117. Sensors 2012, 12  
 
 
89
58.  Yang, G.-Z. Body Sensor Networks; Springer: London, UK, 2006. 
59.  Nasser, N.; Chen, Y. SEEM: Secure and Energy-Efficient Multipath Routing Protocol for 
Wireless Sensor Network. Comput. Commun. 2007, 30, 2401-2412. 
60.  Muraleedharan, R.; Osadciw, L.A. Secure Healthcare Monitoring Network Against Denial-of-
Service Attacks Using Cognitive Intelligence. In Proceedings of Communication Networks and 
Services Research Conference, Halifax, NS, Canada, 5–8 May 2008; pp 165-170. 
61.  Karlof, C.; Wagner, D. Secure Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks: Attacks and 
Countermeasures. Ad Hoc Network 2003, 1, 293-315. 
62.  Misic, J.; Amini, F.; Khan, M. On Security Attacks in Healthcare WSNs Implemented on 
802.15.4 Beacon Enabled Clusters. In Proceedings of IEEE Consumer Communication and 
Networking Conference (CCNC’07), Las Vegas, NV, USA, 11–13 January 2007; pp. 741-745. 
63.  Redondi, A.; Tagliasacchi, M.; Cesana, M.; Borsani, L.; Tarrio, P.; Salice, F. LAURA—
Localization and Ubiquitous Monitoring of Patients for Health Care Support. In Proceedings of 
21th International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications 
Workshops, Istanbul, Turkey, 26–29 September 2010. 
64.  Curtis, D.W.; Pino, E.J.; Bailey, J.M.; Shih, E.I.; Waterman, J.; Vinterbo, S.A.; Stair, T.O.; 
Guttag, J.V.; Greenes, R.A.; Machodo, L.O. SMART—An Integrated Wireless System for 
Monitoring Unattended Patients. J. Am. Med. Inform. Assoc. 2008, 15, 44-53.  
65.  Baca, A.; Kornfeind, P. Rapid Feedback Systems for Elite Sports Training. Pervas. Comput. 
2006, 5, 70-76.  
66.  Wood, A.D.; Stankovic, J.A. Denial of Service in Sensor Networks. IEEE Comput. 2002, 35,  
54-62. 
67.  Raymond, D.R.; Midkiff, S.F. Denial-of-Service in Wireless Sensor Networks: Attacks and 
Defenses. IEEE Pervas. Comput. 2008, 7, 74-81.  
68.  National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics. Available online: http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ 
privrecs.htm (accessed on 5 October 2011). 
69.  Davenport, A.K. Identity Theft that can Kill You. Available online: http://www.law.uh.edu/ 
healthlaw/perspectives/2006/(KD)IdentityTheft.pdf (accessed on 5 October 2011).  
70.  The Data Protection Directive. EU Directive 95/46/EC. Available online: 
http://www.dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?m=&fn=/documents/legal/6aii-1c.htm#1 (accessed on 
6 October 2011). 
71.  Brown, I.; Adams, A.A. The Ethical Challenges of Ubiquitous Healthcare. Int. Rev. Inform. 
Ethics 2007, 8, 53-60. 
72.  Johnson, M.E. Data Hemorrhages in the Healthcare Sector. Available online: 
http://fc09.ifca.ai/papers/54_Data_Hemorrhages.pdf (accessed on 4 October 2011). 
73.  Webb, D. Medical Identity Theft—Not Feeling Like Yourself. Available online: 
http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=ism (accessed on 5 October 
2011). 
74.  Ramli, R.; Zakaria, N.; Sumari, P. Privacy Issues in Pervasive Healthcare Monitoring System:  
A Review. World Acad. Sci. Eng. Technol. 2010, 72, 741-747. 
75.  Kosseim, P.; Emam, K.E. Privacy Interests in Prescription Data. Part 1. IEEE Secur. Privacy 
2009, 7, 72-76. Sensors 2012, 12  
 
 
90
76.  Dementia Overview. Available online: http://www.webmd.com/alzheimers/tc/dementia-topic-
overview (accessed on 10 October 2011).  
77.  Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH). Available 
online: http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/hit2.pdf (accessed on 15 October 2011). 
78.  Strong User Authentication and HIPAA: Cost-Effective Compliance with Federal Security 
Mandates. Available online: http://www.techrepublic.com/whitepapers/strong-user-authentication- 
and-hipaa-cost-effective-compliance-with-federal-security-mandates/2345053 (accessed on 28 
May 2011). 
79.  Le, X.H.; Khalid, M.; Sankar, R.; Lee, S. An Efficient Mutual Authentication and Access 
Control Scheme for Wireless Sensor Network in Healthcare. J. Networks 2011, 27, 355-364.  
80.  Shaikh, R.A.; Lee, S.; Khan, M.A.U.; Song, Y.J. L-Sec: Lightweight Security Protocol for 
Distributed Wireless Sensor Network. In Proceedings of Personal Wireless Communication, 
Albacete, Spain, 20–22 September 2006; pp. 367-377. 
81.  Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography.  Available online: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447 (accessed on 18 July 2011). 
82.  Deffie-Hellman Rfc. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2631.txt (accessed on 20 July 
2011). 
83.  Malasri, K.; Wang, L. Design and Implementation of Secure Wireless Mote-Based Medical 
Sensor Network. Sensors 2009, 9, 6273-6297. 
84.  Seo, S.C.; Han, D.G.; Hong, S. TinyECCK16: An Efficient Field Multiplication Algorithm on 
16-bit Environment and Its Application to Tmote Sky Sensor. IEICE Trans. Inform. Syst. 2009, 
E92.D, 918-928. 
85.  Malasri, K.; Wang, L. SNAP: An Architecture for Secure Medical Sensor Networks.   
In Proceedings of 2nd IEEE Workshop on Wireless Mesh Network, Reston, VA, USA, 25–28 
September 2006; pp. 160-162. 
86.  Chen, X.; Makki, K.; Yen, K.; Pissinou, N. Sensor Network Security: A Survey. IEEE Commun. 
Surv. Tutor. 2009, 11, 52-73. 
87.  Kavitha, T.; Sridharan, D. Security Vulnerabilities in Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey.   
J. Inform. Assur. Secur. 2010, 5, 031-044. 
88.  Boukerche, A.; Oliveira, H.A.B.F.; Nakamura, E.F.; Loureiro, A.A.F. Secure Localization 
Algorithms for Wireless Sensor Networks. IEEE Commun. Mag. 2008, 46, 96-101. 
89.  Boukerche, A.; Ren, Y. A Secure Mobile Healthcare System Using Trust-Based Multicast 
Scheme. IEEE J. Select. Area. Commun. 2009, 27, 387-399. 
90.  Misic, J.; Misic, V. Enforcing Patient Privacy in Healthcare WSNs Through Key Distribution 
Algorithms. Secur. Commun. Network 2008, 1, 417-429.  
91.  HL7 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Role Engineering Process. Available online: 
www.hl7.org/.../Stds_20070919_SW%2022.3 (accessed on 6 October 2011). 
92.  Saleem, S.; Ullah, S.; Kwak, K.S. A Study of IEEE 802.15.4 Security Framework for Wireless 
Body Area Networks. Sensors 2011, 11, 1383-1395. 
93.  Wang, Y.; Attebury, G.; Ramamurthy, B. A Survey of Security Issues in Wireless Sensor 
Networks. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutor. 2006, 8, 2-23. Sensors 2012, 12  
 
 
91
94.  Haque, M.M.; Pathan, A.S.K.; Hong, C.S. Securing u-Healthcare Sensor Networks Using Public 
Key Based Scheme. In Proceedings of 10th International Conference of Advance Communication 
Technology, Pyeongchang, Korea, 19–22 February 2008; pp. 1108-1111. 
95.  Hu, F.; Jiang, M.; Wagner, M.; Dong, D.C. Privacy-Preserving Telecardiology Sensor Networks: 
Toward a Low-Cost Portable Wireless Hardware/Software Codesign. IEEE Trans. Inform. Tech. 
Biomed. 2007, 11, 619-627. 
96.  Dagtas, S.; Pekhteryev, G.; Sahinoglu, Z.; Cam, H.; Challa, N. Real-Time and Secure Wireless 
Health Monitoring. Int. J. Telemed. Appl. 2008, doi: 10.1155/2008/135808. 
97.  Kang, D.O.; Lee, H.J.; Ko, E.J.; Kang, K.; Lee, J. A Wearable Context Aware System for 
Ubiquitous Healthcare. In Proceedings of 28th IEEE EMBS Annual International Conference, 
New York, NY, USA, 30 August–3 September 2006; pp. 5192-5195. 
98.  Lin, X.; Lu, R.; Shen, X.; Nemoto, Y.; Kato, N. SAGE: A Strong Privacy-Preserving Scheme 
Against Global Eavesdropping for eHealth System. IEEE J. Select. Area Commun. 2009, 27, 
365-378. 
99.  Kumar, P.; Lee, Y.-D.; Lee, H.-J. Secure Health Monitoring Using Medical Wireless Sensor 
Networks. In Proceedings of 6th International Conference on Networked Computing and 
Advanced Information Management, Seoul, Korea, 16–18 August 2010; pp. 491-494.  
100.  Wu, G.; Ren, J.; Xia, F.; Xu, Z. An Adaptive Fault-Tolerant Communication Scheme for Body 
Sensor Networks. Sensors 2010, 10, 9590-9608. 
101.  Lee, D.-S.; Bhardwaj, S.; Alasaaela, E.; Chung, W.-Y. An ECG Analysis on Sensor Node for 
Reducing Traffic Overload in u-Healthcare with Wireless Sensor Network. In Proceedings of 
IEEE Sensors 2007, Atlanta, GA, USA, 28–31 October 2007; pp. 256-259.  
102.  Li, H.; Tan, J. Body Sensor Network Based Context Aware QRS Detection. In Proceedings of 
Pervasive Health Conference and Workshops, Innsbruck, Austria, 29 November–1 December 
2006; pp. 1-8.  
103.  Ameen, M.A.; Nessa, A.; Kwak, K.S. QoS Issues with Focus on Wireless Body Area Networks. 
In Proceedings of 2008 Third International Conference on Convergence and Hybrid Information 
Technology, Busan, Korea, 11–13 November 2008; pp. 801-807.  
104.  Zhou, G.; Lu, J.; Wan, C.Y.; Yarvis, M; Stankovic, J. BodyQoS: Adaptive and Radio-Agnostic 
QoS for Body Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of 27th Conference on Computer Communications, 
Phoenix, AZ, USA, 13–19 April 2008; pp. 565-573. 
© 2012 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). 